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HOUSING STARTS  INCREASED  dramatically through the second quarter of 
1971,  rising  almost  60 percent  over  their  level in the first  quarter  of 1970. 
Private  nonfarm  starts  for 1971:2  were  at a seasonally  adjusted  annual  rate 
of 1,961,000  units, and in August  reached  a rate of 2,235,000  units, their 
highest  level in the postwar  period.  While starts  rebounded  throughout 
1970,  their continued  strong  increases  through  1971  have surprised  many 
observers. 
The major  factors  in this surge  of homebuilding  have  been the strength 
of the demand  for housing  and the abundance  of mortgage  money.  High 
rates  of household  formation  and  low levels  of housing  starts  have  resulted 
in a continuing  drop  in vacancy  rates  over  the last five  years.  The easing  of 
interest rates, especially  short-term  rates during 1970 and early 1971, 
helped  to revive  the flow of savings  to commercial  banks and thrift  insti- 
tutions.  During  the first  half of 1971,  households  accumulated  deposits  at 
thrift institutions  at a phenomenal  rate, four and one-half  times larger 
than that during  the same time period a year earlier.  Preliminary  data 
indicate  that, on a seasonally  adjusted  basis, households  were accumu- 
lating savings deposits at thrift institutions  at an annual rate of $46.2 
billion. Adding  in time deposits  at commercial  banks  raises  the accumu- 
lation  of total savings  deposits  to $85  billion.  This  increase  in savings  flows 
has for the time being eliminated  financial  considerations  as a constraint 
on the level of residential  construction. 
Even had the improved  availability  of mortgage  credit  been accurately 
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foreseen,  questions  would  have  arisen  about  the real  resource  requirements 
to build  2 million  units  and  about  their  availability  to the housing  industry. 
To examine  the potential  bottlenecks  in supply,  this paper  looks at the 
labor and material  requirements  to build houses, focusing  discussion  on 
an additional  500,000  units. This figure  has several  advantages:  Starts  in 
the second  quarter  of 1971  were  at a rate about  500,000  higher  than those 
in the last two years;  thus data developed  from  this increment  may throw 
some light on the recent buildup.  Furthermore,  the rate of. 2.5 million 
units, which has been used at times as a desirable  target,  would mean a 
further  increase  of about  500,000  units  over  the level  of the second  quarter. 
But this figure  is used only as a measuring  rod for developing  labor and 
material  requirements  and figures  based on it can be adjusted  easily to 
some other  total. 
The Historical  Perspective 
The rapid  rise  in starts  from  early  1970  is but one example  of several  dra- 
matic  increases,  demonstrated  in Figure  1. To date  the largest  and sharpest 
bulge  in the postwar  period  was in 1949  and  early  1950,  when  the rate  rose 
almost  850,000  units  in five quarters.  Other  sharp  gains occurred  in 1954, 
1958,  and 1967.  While  Figure  1 shows  another  peak  in the first  quarter  of 
1964,  the ascent  to it was  much  more  gradual  than  the others. 
With the exception  of 1958, all the sharp  increases  in housing starts 
began  during  periods  of low aggregate  unemployment  and,  with  the excep- 
tion of 1967,  ended  during  periods  of high  unemployment.  The increase  in 
1958  was accompanied  throughout  by high unemployment  while  the 1967 
increase  occurred  during  a period  of low unemployment  throughout.  With 
the exception  of that  in 1949-50,  all the major  expansions  in housing  starts 
took place during  periods  when  nonresidential  construction  was stagnant 
if not declining. 
Price  behavior  during  past rapid  buildups  of housing  starts  has varied 
markedly.  As measured  by the Boeckh construction  cost index for resi- 
dential structures,  the expansions  in 1954 and 1958 were accomplished 
with essentially  stable  or declining  relative  prices  for new homes. As dis- 
cussed in more detail below, the Boeckh index tends to  overstate  the 
"true"  increase  in construction  costs. Nevertheless,  it declined  1 percent 
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during  the quarters  immediately  following  its end.  This  was at a time  when 
overall  prices,  as measured  by the implicit  private  nonfarm  deflator,  rose 
by 1.9  percent.  The 1958  expansion  was accompanied  by a modest  increase 
in the Boeckh  index in excess  of general  inflation;  however,  when adjust- 
ment is made for the overestimate  implicit  in the Boeckh index, there 
appears  to have been little movement  in relative  prices  at that time. 
The 1949 and 1967 expansions  were accompanied  by much larger 
increases  in the Boeckh  index and in relative  prices.  Through  the period 
immediately  following  the 1949 surge  in starts,  the Boeckh  index showed 
an increase  of 4.0 percent  in excess of changes  in the private  nonfarm 
deflator.  In 1967  the excess  was 4.7 percent. 
There are several  reasons  for these differences  in price behavior.  For 
one thing,  the 1954  and 1958  buildups  were  the smallest  of the four. Fur- 
thermore,  they were set against  high or rising  unemployment  in both the 
economy  as a whole  and  construction  taken  by itself.  By contrast,  the 1967 
expansion  in starts  came at a time of extremely  tight  labor  markets  in the 
aggregate  and  in construction.  While  the 1949  expansion  took place  during 
a period of rising unemployment  in general,  nonresidential  construction 
was expanding  markedly,  and most likely  affected  adversely  the supply  of 
skilled labor on which housebuilding  could draw. As seen below, the 
supply  of manpower  to residential  construction  is sensitive  to conditions 
in the labor markets  for both the economy as a whole and total con- 
struction. 
Slack  in aggregate  and  construction  labor  markets  has characterized  the 
1970-71  expansion.  From  the first  quarter  of 1970  through  the second  quar- 
ter of 1971,  the Boeckh  index  rose  2.4 percent  in excess  of the private  non- 
farm  deflator,  although  allowance  for the overestimate  in the Boeckh  index 
would  lower  this figure  somewhat.  While  more  time is needed  for the full 
effect on construction  costs, it does appear  that the current  buildup  in 
houses  will be accompanied  by an increase  in their  relative  prices,  in con- 
trast  to the experience  of 1954  and 1958.  This increase  reflects  the recent 
large  wage  settlements  in the  building  trades  and  the  higher  prices  of lumber 
and  plywood. 
This  paper  considers  in detail  the labor,  material,  and  mortgage  require- 
ments  for building  houses  and contrasts  these  requirements  with available 
supplies.  The  figures  presented  are  projections,  not unqualified  predictions. 
They estimate  labor and material  requirements  assuming  that units are 
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an increase  in demand  will raise its price and induce  someone-a  home- 
builder  or someone  else-to  reduce  his demand  and use an appropriate 
substitute.  A prediction  would attempt  to take account of these effects 
with appropriate  demand  and supply  elasticities.  The value of the projec- 
tions  presented  below  is in identifying  areas  where  large  increases  in demand 
might  run  into supply  bottlenecks. 
Labor  Requirements 
Labor requirements  to build 500,000  housing units are developed  by 
occupation.  The basic data come from surveys  by the Bureau  of Labor 
Statistics  (BLS) of on-site  manhour  requirements  per $1,000  of construc- 
tion cost, by occupation  and type of construction.'  Extensive  surveys  on 
labor  requirements  were  conducted  in the early  sixties.  The  BLS  is currently 
engaged  in updating  these surveys  and new data from a survey  of single- 
family  construction  in 1969  have  just become available.  Recent data for 
multifamily  construction  are not available.  In fact no survey  of apartment 
construction  as such  was conducted.  Consequently,  labor  requirements  for 
multifamily  structures  are based on data for college dormitory  construc- 
tion. A comparison  of the two surveys  for single-family  construction  indi- 
cates that, with appropriate  allowances  for changes  in productivity  and 
prices,  labor  requirements  derived  from  the two agree  quite  closely. 
The use of the data on manhour  requirements  calls  for  judgments  about 
the distribution  of units  by type,  location,  and  size.  Judgments  must  also be 
made  about  the increases  in labor  productivity  and  construction  costs over 
the years  since  the original  surveys.  On the basis of recent  experience,  55 
percent  of the half-million  starts,  or 275,000  units,  are  assumed  to be single- 
family  houses,  with the remaining  225,000  units  in multifamily  structures. 
Both  single-  and  multifamily  units  are  distributed  regionally  on the basis  of 
1969  experience.2 
1. Robert Ball and Larry  Ludwig,  "Labor  Requirements  for Construction  of Single- 
family Houses," Monthly  Labor Review, Vol. 94 (September  1971), pp. 12-14; U.S. 
Bureau  of Labor Statistics,  Labor  and Material  Requirements  for College  Housing  Con- 
struction,  BLS Bulletin 1441  (1965). 
2. As an alternative,  starts could be distributed  by type and region in proportion  to 
the most recent  advance.  Such a distribution  would make the labor requirement  figures 
more accurate  as regards  the recent  upswing  in starts.  However,  two factors  favored  the 
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The construction  cost of a single-family  unit is assumed  to be $18,500 
in 1970  dollars,  a figure  slightly  above  the actual  1970  average  of $18,325. 
The construction  cost of a multifamily  unit is assumed  to be $12,000  in 
1970  dollars,  a bit further  above  the 1970  figure  of $11,685.  These  figures 
assume  little or no change  in constant-dollar  spending  on construction  per 
new unit, or in the "amount"  of house  per  housing  unit.  A comparison  of 
current-dollar  construction  costs for privately  owned one-unit  structures 
and an adjusted  construction  cost index for residences  reveals  an actual 
decline  in the constant-dollar  cost of housing  units in the last few years.3 
In fact, from  1969  to 1970  even the current-dollar  construction  cost figure 
declined  by $900 per unit. The trend  in cost for multifamily  units is not 
so marked.  Constant-dollar  costs oscillated  around  a declining  trend  from 
1964  to 1969;  however,  they rose substantially  in 1970,  returning  to their 
1964  level. 
These declines  in the amount  of real house per housing  unit may be a 
reflection  of the introduction  of several  new programs  designed  to help 
families  of low and moderate  income to buy or rent new housing.  Sub- 
sidized  starts have expanded  rapidly  in the last few years, and were up 
from 14 percent  of total starts  in 1969  to 30 percent  in 1970.  Some  further 
advance  is expected,  but the buildup  in all starts  should  mean  a constant 
or slightly  declining  share  for subsidized  starts. 
The recent  drop  in the amount  of real  house  per start  could also reflect 
income and price effects.  However,  given plausible  estimates  of income 
and price  elasticities,  only a slower  rate of increase,  not an actual  decline, 
is explainable.  From 1967 to 1970 the adjusted  construction  cost index 
for residential  structures  rose 16 percent  while the GNP consumption 
deflator  rose just over 13 percent,  for an increase  in the relative  price of 
structures  of 2.9 percent.  During  the same  time per capita  real  disposable 
income rose 7.9 percent.  Most estimates  of price and income elasticities 
of the demand  for housing  put both in the vicinity  of 1 to 1.5 in absolute 
value.4  These figures  pointed  to an increase  in the amount  of house per 
start  of 5 to 7.5 percent. 
requirements  for total private  nonfarm  starts  by multiplying  labor requirements  for the 
500,000  starts  by the ratio of total starts  to 500,000  units.  Second, it is not at all obvious 
that further  increases  in starts  will follow the most recent  pattern;  they may  well revert  to 
longer-run  patterns.  In any case, the two sets of weightings  lead to very similar  results. 
3. See discussion  of this construction  cost index below. 
4. See Henry  Aaron, "Income  Taxes  and Housing,"  American  Economic  Review,  Vol. 
60 (December  1970),  p. 799, and Frank de Leeuw, "The Demand for Housing: A Re- Craig Swan  353 
With  figures  on the size of units one can compute  the construction  cost 
of 500,000  units in 1970 dollars.  However,  to use the BLS survey  data 
on labor  requirements,  these construction  costs were deflated  to the year 
of the relevant  BLS survey  by indexes  based on the Boeckh  measures  for 
residences  and apartments.  These are input cost indexes,  calculated  by 
averaging  prices for material  inputs and labor wage rates. Increases  in 
either material  prices or wage rates will cause such an index to rise. 
However,  increases  in labor productivity  or in the efficiency  of material 
handling  are not reflected  in reductions  in it. In essence these indexes 
assume that labor productivity  and material  handling procedures  are 
stagnant.  While the Boeckh  indexes  make some allowance  for improved 
labor  efficiency,  other  evidence  suggests  that the allowance  is inadequate. 
For the period  1962-69  the average  annual  increase  in the Boeckh  index 
for residences  is 1.8 percentage  points higher  than that in the Census  Bu- 
reau's  hedonic  price  index  for  new  houses.  The  hedonic  price  index  assumes 
the price  of a house  can  be estimated  by the price  of its components.  To es- 
timate  the inflation  in construction  costs, a no-inflation  price  is estimated 
using base year prices  but current  year specifications  of the components. 
This no-inflation  price  is then compared  with  the actual  current  year  price 
to estimate  the inflation  in construction  costs. This procedure  is concep- 
tually  superior  to an input  cost  measure  of inflation.  From 1962  to 1969  the 
increase  in the Boeckh  index  is at an average  rate of 4.8 percent  per  year, 
while  the increase  in the Census  Bureau  index  is only  3.0 percent  per  year.5 
Additional  evidence  on the overestimate  of construction  costs comes 
from  a comparison  with  the  work  of R. I. Gordon.  Gordon  has  constructed 
a price  index  for all types  of structures,  allowing  for increases  in efficiency, 
which  gives  a picture  for the postwar  period  markedly  different  from  that 
presented  by the Boeckh  index.6  From 1947  to 1965  the average  annual  in- 
view of Cross-Section  Evidence,"  Review  of Economics  and  Statistics,  Vol. 53 (February 
1971), p. 10. These elasticities  refer to demand  for a stock of houses, measured  as the 
value per unit times the number  of units. Thus a household could increase  its stock of 
houses by increasing  the valuation  or number  of units  it owns. Data on households  and 
housing units suggest  little movement  in the number  of units per household.  Assuming 
no big boom in second  homes, the increased  demand  for a stock of houses  would express 
itself in more expensive  units. 
5. Unpublished  data collected by the Federal  Housing Administration  also support 
the conclusion  that the Boeckh  index overestimates  the annual  rise of construction  costs 
of single-family  houses. See Robert J. Gordon, "Measurement  Bias in Price  Indexes  for 
Capital  Goods," Review  of Income  and Wealth,  Series 17, No. 2 (June 1971),  esp. sec. 5. 
6. Robert J. Gordon, "A New View of Real Investment  in Structures,  1919-1966," 
Review  of Economics  and  Statistics,  Vol. 50 (November 1968),  pp. 417-28. 354  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1971 
crease  in the Boeckh  index  for all structures  is 1.6 percentage  points  more 
than  the increase  in the Gordon  index  for  the final  price  of structures.  From 
1960  to 1965  the discrepancy  is 1.2  percentage  points.  New price  indices  for 
residential  structures  were  calculated  by subtracting  1.8 and 1.6  percentage 
points  from  the annual  movement  of the Boeckh  indices  for residences  and 
apartments. 
The product  of the number  of units and the deflated  average  construc- 
tion cost per  unit  is the total constant-dollar  volume  of construction  of the 
500,000  units. Since these added units are to be built in 1971, not the 
sixties,  some adjustment  for changes  in labor  productivity  must  be made. 
The Gordon  data indicate  that labor  productivity  increased  at an average 
rate of 3.0 percent  per year  from 1947  to 1965.  From 1960  to 1965,  how- 
ever,  the increase  was only 1.9 percent  per year.  The Gordon  estimate  for 
1960-65 agrees  exactly  with the estimated  increase  in labor productivity 
from  the new BLS  survey  of single-family  house  construction.7  The  figures 
reported  below  are  all based  on that estimated  growth. 
The figure of 1.9 percent  was used to adjust all labor requirements. 
Changes  in labor  requirements  and  in efficiency  may  differ  for specific  skills. 
Changes  in construction  techniques  or in the characteristics  of a typical 
house  may alter  the occupation  mix of labor.  Thus  greater  efficiency  would 
mean that fewer bricklayers  are needed  to do the same work but more 
extensive  use of brick  in a typical  house  would  increase  the need  for brick- 
layers and slow the reduction  in labor requirements.  Separate  rates of 
decline  in labor  requirements  for each  skill  class  could have  been  extrapo- 
lated  from  the two studies  on single-family  house  construction.  Such  a pro- 
cedure  was not followed  for several  reasons.  It was not known whether 
similar  trends  applied  to the construction  of multifamily  units  and  it seemed 
dangerous  to extrapolate  on the basis  of only  two observations.  Relative  to 
the 1.9 percent  figure,  the single-family  survey  data show a slightly  faster 
decline  in total  skilled  labor  requirements  as compared  with  unskilled  labor. 
Thus  the estimates  presented  below  may  overestimate  skilled  labor  require- 
ments. By specific  skills, labor requirements  for cement finishers,  sheet 
metal workers,  painters,  and plumbers  have declined  most rapidly,  while 
labor requirements  for electricians  and operating  engineers  have declined 
the least. 
Tables 1 and 2 present  the estimate  of 392,500  required  on-site man- 
7. Ball and Ludwig, "Labor  Requirements,"  p. 13. Craig  Swan  355 
Table  1. On-site  Labor  Requirements  for the Construction  of 500,000 
Housing  Units,  by Proficiency  Status  and  Occupation  of Worker,  1971 
Thousands  of manhours 
Proficiency status 
or occupation  Requirement 
All occupations  392.5 
Skilled  271.6 
Bricklayers  28.8 
Carpenters  113.9 
Cement  finishers  9.2 
Electricians  17.5 
Ironworkers  5.7 
Operating  engineers  7.1 
Painters  24.0 
Plasterers  8.9 
Plumbers  25.7 
Sheet metal workers  5.3 
Other  25.5 
Unskilled  120.9 
Source: Author's estimates based on Table 2 and discussion in text. Figures are rounded and may not 
add to totals. 
hours  and  the  underlying  manhour  requirements  from  which  it was  derived. 
While the data in Table 1 are in terms  of thousands  of manhours,  most 
recent  estimates  of hours  worked  per  year  per  construction  worker  suggest 
that they are also good approximations  for the number  of men necessary 
to  supply these labor requirements,  but not the number  of jobs. In a 
special  study the BLS examined  the work experience  of individual  con- 
struction  workers  from union health and welfare  fund records  in four 
metropolitan  areas, Detroit, Omaha, Milwaukee, and Southern Cali- 
fornia.8  As Table 3 indicates,  all workers  in skilled  occupations  averaged 
about 1,000  hours  of work  throughout  the year. 
Other  evidence  suggests  that while a full-time  position in construction 
involves  over 1,800  hours  of work  per year,  construction  workers  average 
only 1,000 hours of construction  work per year. From 1960 to  1967 
employment  in contract  construction  times  hours  of work  per week  times 
8. The advantage  of these data  is that they measure  the experience  of specific  workers. 
A disadvantage  is that they pertain  only to work that was subject  to the collective  bar- 
gaining  agreement;  construction  work not covered,  due to type or location of work, is 
not included.  The quality of the data also depends  on employer  compliance  and com- 
pleteness.  Data were collected  for 1966 and 1967 and may reflect  the general  slowdown 
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Table 2.  On-site Labor Requirements  per $1,000 Construction  Cost for 
Single-family  and Multifamily  Housing, by Occupation  of Worker, 1960s 
Manhours 
Proficiency  status  Single-family  Multifamily 
or occupation  housinga  housingb 
All occupationso  50.5  91.8 
Skilled  35.7  60.6 
Bricklayers  3.0  8.9 
Carpenters  18.1  16.7 
Cement  finishers  1.3  1.8 
Electricians  1.6  6.0 
Ironworkers  ...  3.4 
Operating  engineers  0.9  1.6 
Painters  3.8  3.6 
Plasterers  0.9  1.8 
Plumbers  2.2  9.1 
Sheet metal workers  0.7  1.3 
Other  3.2  6.4 
Unskilledd  14.8  31.2 
Sources: Single-family-Robert  Ball and Larry  Ludwig, "Labor Requirements  for Construction of Single- 
family Houses," Monthly  Labor  Review,  Vol. 94 (September  1971), pp. 12,13; multifamily-Bureau  of Labor 
Statistics,Labor  and Material  Requirementsfor  College  Housing Construction,  BLS Bulletin 1441  (1965), p. 13. 
Data were adjusted for the regional distribution of starts as discussed in the text. 
a.  1969 data. 
b.  1960-61 data. 
c.  Excludes general supervisors, professional, technical, and clerical workers. 
d.  Unskilled are taken to be laborers, helpers and tenders, and other miscellaneous categories. 
Table 3. Average Number of Hours Worked per Year by Construction 
Workers, by Occupation, July 1966-June 1967 
Occupation  Hours worked 
Skilleda  1,016 
Bricklayers  1,002 
Carpenters  1,014 
Cement  masons  903 
Iron workers  981 
Lathers  1,087 
Operating  engineers  1,116 
Plasterers  1,044 
Laborers  660 
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Seasonality and Manpower  in Construction,  BLS Bulletin 1642 
(1970), Tables A17-A20. The data are for workers in Detroit, Omaha, Milwaukee, and Southern California. 
a.  Includes only skilled workers listed. Craig  Swan  357 
fifty weeks has averaged  5.652 million manhours.  Over  the same period 
social  security  records  indicate  that an average  of 5.566  million  individuals 
reported  earnings  in contract  construction,  for an average  of 1,015  hours 
of work per person.  Figures  for individual  years show only small varia- 
tion, with a range  of 997 to 1,026  hours  per person  reporting  earnings  in 
contract  construction.  On this basis,  the estimated  requirement  of 392,500 
manhours  can be translated  into 220,000  full-time  jobs. Any change  in the 
utilization  of existing  manpower  through  an increase  in the number  of 
hours  worked  per  year  would  mean  a corresponding  drop  in the number  of 
men needed  to supply  the required  number  of manhours.  This gain could 
be quite  large  if the existing  labor force, not just additional  workers,  ex- 
perienced  increased  hours  of work. 
How will this heightened  demand  for labor  be met? Special  features  of 
the residential  construction  labor market,  combined  with current  labor 
market  conditions,  may  help  homebuilders  to meet  possible  labor  shortages 
while building  500,000  units.9  Homebuilders  have traditionally  stood at 
the end of the manpower  line. The supply of labor to construction  is 
quite sensitive  to aggregate  labor market  conditions  and the supply of 
skilled  labor  to homebuilders  is sensitive  to the availability  of other  con- 
struction  work. 
Some of these issues  are illuminated  by the following  statistical  results 
CLF= -0.11  +  1.01 CE+  2.58  AU, 
(0.057)  (0.200) 
RI =  0.942, standard  error  of estimate =  0.740. 
Figures  in parentheses  are the standard 
errors  of the estimated  coefficients. 
where 
CLF  =  annual percentage  change in the contract  construction  labor 
force, 1949-70 
CE =  annual  percentage  change  in contract  construction  employment, 
1949-70 
AU =  annual  change  in the civilian labor force unemployment  rate. 
Aggregate  unemployment  rates have a strong  impact on the size of the 
9. The description  of the residential  construction  labor market  that follows draws 
heavily  on J. T. Dunlop and D. Q. Mills, "Manpower  in Construction:  A Profile  of the 
Industry  and Projections  to 1975,"  in The  Report  of the  President's  Committee  on Urban 
Housing:  Technical  Studies,  Vol. 2 (1968),  pp. 239-86a. 358  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1971 
construction  labor force, as indicated  by the large coefficient  on the A  U 
variable.  There appears  to be a large group of men with construction 
skills and with high mobility who move in and out of construction  in 
response  to job  opportunities  elsewhere.  As labor markets  in general 
tighten,  these previously  unemployed  construction  workers  find work in 
other  industries;  as labor  markets  loosen, the ease of entry  into construc- 
tion (work  forces  are  being  continually  formed  as old projects  are  finished 
and new ones started)  results in an increase  in unemployment  in con- 
struction.  The coefficient  very close to unity on the CE variable  reveals 
that the increases  in construction  employment  that have occurred  have 
attracted  labor  into the sector  almost  man  for man.  This  is another  indica- 
tion of the wide dispersion  of construction  skills  and the mobility  of these 
workers. Once these directly induced movements  of labor have been 
accounted  for, there is a further  substantial  flow of manpower  into and 
out of construction  in response  to changes  in other  job opportunities. 
These  people presumably  have construction  skills and would accept  con- 
struction  jobs. 
The availability  of skilled  labor  to residential  construction  is quite  sensi- 
tive to labor market  conditions  in construction  as a whole. For several 
reasons-less favorable  wages  and  fringe  benefits,  shorter  duration  of  jobs, 
and others-homebuilders  have  often  been  forced  to accept  poorly  trained 
workmen  or to find  and  train  new  workmen.  But  they  have  adapted  to their 
unfavorable  position  in the manpower  line in a way  that, given  the current 
labor  market  situation  in both the whole economy  and construction,  sug- 
gests  that  the  residential  construction  work  force  could  be expanded  rapidly 
and  without  too much  trouble. 
Responding  to their  shortages  of skilled  workers  and  their  need  to train 
new workers,  homebuilders  have developed  a dual labor  force  in which a 
crew of highly  skilled  workers-keymen-is  used to supervise  jobs while 
transitory  workmen  are hired and trained  as needed.  Dunlop and Mills 
suggest  that 
the task of training  a man to do non-key  man's  work on a homebuilding  site is 
not necessarily  long and difficult.  Homebuilders  often assert  their ability  to train 
a good carpenter  or machinery  operator  within a few months.  Such training  is 
usually  informal,  consisting  of on-the-job  instruction  by a more  skilled  mechanic 
and work  experience.  In periods  of labor  shortage  in construction  home builders 
hire and train many persons.10 
10. Dunlop and Mills, "Manpower  in Construction,"  p. 245. Craig  Swan  359 
Homebuilders  are able  to engage  in such  hiring  and  training  because  their 
work sites are often unorganized  or poorly policed by union business 
agents.  Unionization  in construction  as a whole has been put at between 
60 and  70 percent.  Industry  observers  estimate  that for single-family  con- 
struction  unionization  is perhaps  one-half  that in total construction.  The 
ability of a homebuilder  to retain his keymen  is dependent  upon labor 
market  conditions  in construction  as a whole. When construction  labor 
markets  are tight, keymen are attracted  to other types of construction 
with higher  pay and longer  projects. 
Because  of their adjustment  to past labor market  conditions,  home- 
builders  are currently  in a quite favorable  manpower  position.  Aggregate 
unemployment  and unemployment  in construction  have both increased 
markedly  from  their  low levels  in 1969.  The seasonally  adjusted  unemploy- 
ment rate for private  wage and salary  workers  reporting  construction  as 
the industry  of their  last  job averaged  10.7  percent  for the first  six months 
of 1971, as contrasted  with a rate of 6 percent  for the year 1969. On a 
seasonally  adjusted  basis,  employment  in contract  construction  during  the 
first half of 1971 was 3,246,000,  a drop of 190,000  from employment  in 
1969.11 
Data from the household  survey,  covering  individuals  without  regard 
to where they work, showed 375,000 unemployed  carpenters  and con- 
struction  craftsmen  in January  1971.  This  was an increase  of 194,000  over 
the same figure  for 1969. By July 1971 the number  of unemployed  car- 
penters  and craftsmen  had declined  to 181,000,  still an excess  of 122,000 
over  the comparable  figure  for 1969.  The  number  of unemployed  construc- 
tion laborers  followed  a similar  trend,  with an excess  over 1969  of 118,000 
in January  and 34,000  in July. 
In an attempt  to assess  the availability  of skilled  manpower,  estimates  of 
total manhours  in construction,  by skills,  were  derived  for 1969  and 1970 
in a manner  analogous  to that used  to obtain  the manpower  estimates  for 
500,000  housing units; that is, figures  on real construction  activity  and 
11. Contract construction  refers to private establishments  performing  construction 
activity-new, maintenance  and repair  (SIC 15-17). It excludes  government  agencies  en- 
gaged  in construction  activity, operative  builders,  and force account  workers.  Operative 
builders are those primarily  engaged in construction on their own account for sale 
rather  than as contractors.  In 1967 operative  builders  had 72,305 employees,  compared 
with 3,341,452  for contract construction.  Force account construction  is performed  by 
an establishment  primarily  engaged  in some other  business,  with its own employees  and 
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on-site  labor requirements  were used to estimate  manhours  in total con- 
struction  for selected  skills.12  Table  4 compares  the decline  in manhours  in 
construction  between 1969 and 1970 with the manhour  requirements  of 
500,000 housing units for selected  occupations.  With some exceptions, 
primarily  bricklayers,  carpenters,  and  painters,  there  appears  to have  been  a 
rough  balance  between  the amounts  of manpower  released  from  the decline 
in construction  activity  from 1969 to 1970 and the amounts  needed  for 
500,000  housing  units. 
Since  homebuilding  in fact expanded  by 500,000  units  between  1970  and 
1971,  the manpower  requirements  of this recent  increase  have  just about 
offset the manpower  resources  released during the decline in  overall 
construction  activity between 1969 and 1970. If  employment  in non- 
residential  construction  had been unchanged  between  1970  and 1971,  one 
would  expect  total construction  employment  in 1971  to have recovered  to 
its 1969 level. However,  employment  in contract  construction  in 1971 is 
below  the 1969  level by almost  200,000,  reflecting  the continued  weakness 
of nonresidential  construction.  Real nonresidential  construction  activity 
has declined,  although  dollar  expenditures  have increased.  Current-dollar 
expenditures  for nonresidential  construction  in June 1971 were, at a 
seasonally  adjusted  rate,  5.4 percent  above  their  value  for 1970;  the Boeckh 
index  of the construction  cost of nonresidential  structures  rose 8.9 percent 
in the same  interval.  After  adjustment  for the overestimate  in the Boeckh 
index,  these figures  suggest  a decline  in real activity  of about 2.0 percent. 
This drop in real nonresidential  activity,  reinforced  presumably  by in- 
creasing  productivity,  has lowered  total employment  in contract  construc- 
tion despite  the resurgence  of homebuilding.  Given  mid-1971  levels  of real 
nonresidential  activity,  the increase  in total construction  employment  by 
220,000  required  for an additional  500,000  housing  starts  would  raise  total 
construction  employment  merely to  1969 levels. The weakness of the 
overall  labor  market  would  make  such  an expansion  quite  feasible. 
The estimates  in Table  I of manpower  required,  by skills,  are  on a highly 
aggregative  basis  and  do not guarantee  that  the regional  distribution  of un- 
employed  manpower  matches  the regional  increases  in housing  activity. 
Advances  in starts  for the second quarter  of 1971 (seasonally  adjusted), 
as contrasted  with starts  in 1970,  ranged  from 12.7  percent  in the North- 
east  to 48.4  percent  in the West.  Starts  in the North  Central  region  were  up 
12. See Dunlop and Mills, "Manpower  in Construction,"  pp. 264-71, for a discus- 
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Table  4. Decline  in Manhours  in Construction,  1969  to 1970,  and  Manhour 
Requirements  for 500,000  Housing  Units,  by Selected  Skills 
Thousands 
Manhour 
Decline in  requirements 
manhours,  for 500,000 
Occupation  1969 to 1970  housing  units 
Bricklayers  22.6  28.8 
Carpenters  79.1  113.9 
Cement  finishers  6.7  9.2 
Electricians  18.3  17.5 
Ironworkers  5.6  5.7 
Operating  engineers  10.5  7.1 
Painters  15.7  24.0 
Plumbers  24.0  25.7 
Unskilled  107.8  120.9 
Source: Author's estimates. See text for method. 
36.4  percent  and  those  in the South  38.1  percent.  To assess  possible  regional 
labor  shortages  requires  data on total construction  activity  by region,  but 
the only such data available  report construction  activity authorized  in 
permit-issuing  places. Table 5 lists the changes  in the value of permit- 
authorized  construction  from  January-May  of 1969  to January-May  1971. 
While  these  figures  do not include  public  nonresidential  construction,  they 
suggest  that construction  manpower  can be expected  to be available  in the 
Northeast,  North Central,  and Western  regions  of the country,  and, de- 
pending  on the geographical  mobility  of workers,  may  be in relatively  short 
supply  in the South. 
Taken  together  these  figures  suggest  that  manpower  is currently  available 
for sustaining  the level of housing  starts  at 2 million  units  and  for facilitat- 
ing a further  expansion.  Should  nonresidential  construction  or aggregate 
activity  advance  substantially,  the supply  of manpower  to residential  con- 
struction  could  be put in  jeopardy. 
In a recent  issue  of Brookings  Papers, Charles  Bischoff  presented  projec- 
tions of expenditures  on nonresidential  structures.13  The consensus  projec- 
tion, averaging  five alternative  models of investment  behavior,  suggests  a 
depressed  level of private  nonresidential  construction  activity  through  the 
first  half of 1973;  in that  period,  expenditures  of $21.1  billion  (1958  prices) 
13. Charles W. Bischoff, "Business Investment in  the  1970s: A  Comparison of 
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Table  5. Percentage  Change  in the Current-dollar  Value  of Construction 
Authorized  in Permit-issuing  Places  in the United  States,  by Region, 
January-May  1969  to January-May  1971 
Percentage  change  between 
January-May  1969 and 
January-May  1971 
Region  Residentiala  Nonresidentialb 
Northeast  6.7  -15.5 
North Central  10.9  -0.8 
South  32.6  14.7 
West  37.4  -1.8 
Source: Construction  Review, Vol. 17 (May 1971, July 1971), Tables C-3, C-6. 
a.  Private and public housekeeping residential construction. 
b.  Total private nonresidential construction. 
are still below those in the last half of 1970  and well below their  peak of 
$24.6  billion  in the third  quarter  of 1969.  Even  more  optimistic  forecasts  of 
GNP growth  do not reverse  the picture  of prolonged  depressed  activity. 
So long as aggregate  unemployment  remains  high,  the supply  of labor  to 
construction  in general  will be ample.  If commercial  construction  remains 
at depressed  levels,  the supply  of skilled  manpower  to homebuilders  will  be 
easy  and  they  will have  no trouble  in holding  their  keymen. 
If, however,  the  new  economic  program  announced  by President  Nixon  in 
August  1971  has an immediate  large  stimulative  effect  on employment,  the 
supply  of manpower  to residential  construction  could  be adversely  affected. 
A drop  much  below  5 percent  in the aggregate  unemployment  rate  not only 
would make it difficult  to hire  labor to build 2.5 million  units, but might 
also lead to shortages  simply  in maintaining  a 2 million  unit  rate. 
Material  Requirements 
To what extent  would  the pressures  implicit  in building  an increment  of 
500,000  housing  units  force  up the prices  of construction  materials?  How 
would  this affect  the selling  prices  of houses? 
The 1963  input-output  structure  of the American  economy  was used to 
identify  industries  that sold large  proportions  of their  output  to residential 
construction.  The construction  of 500,000  housing  units gives rise to de- 
mand for additional  materials  not only by the construction  industry  but 
also  by industries  that  supply  it. To analyze  these  total  requirements,  indus- Craig Swan  363 
tries  were  ranked  by the ratio  of total requirements  of residential  construc- 
tion to their  total output. 
Table  6 lists  the industries  in which  more  than  5 percent  of total output  is 
attributable  to the requirements  of residential  construction.  From the first 
column,  which  reveals  the dependency  of particular  industries  on home- 
building,  it is seen  to be a primary  market  for lumber  and  wood, stone  and 
clay,  and  fabricated  metal  products  (primarily  metal  sanitary  ware,  plumb- 
ing fittings  and  brass  goods,  heating  equipment,  and  metal  doors,  sash,  and 
trim).  From the second column,  indicating  the dependence  of residential 
construction  on these  industries,  lumber  and  wood,  stone  and  clay,  and  fab- 
ricated  metal  products  again  appear  to be most important,  accounting  for 
over  43 percent  of material  inputs. 
What  effect  would  building  500,000  more  housing  units  have  on the price 
and quantity  of these material  inputs?  To answer  this question  data are 
presented  on recent  price  and  quantity  behavior  of selected  materials.  (Lum- 
ber and plywood  are treated  separately  in the next section.)  Figure  2 de- 
picts output and price indexes  for selected  material  inputs  from 1965  to 
1970.  All prices  have  been  deflated  by the wholesale  price  index  for indus- 
Table  6. Relation  of Selected  Industries  to Residential  Construction,  1963 
Ratio of 
Ratio of  direct  material 
industry  output  requirements 
attributable  to  to total 
residential  material 
construction  requirements 
to total  of residential 
Industry  output  construction 
Forestry  and fishery  products  14.6  ... 
Iron and ferroalloy  ores mining  6.5  ... 
Nonferrous  metal ores mining  7.3  ... 
Stone and clay mining  and quarrying  19.8  0.5 
Lumber  and wood products,  except containers  40.5  16.5 
Household furniture  8.4  2.0 
Paints and allied products  11.2  1.0 
Stone and clay products  31.3  15.3 
Primary  iron and steel manufacturing  6.5  2.9 
Primary  nonferrous  metals manufacturing  9.8  2.3 
Heating, plumbing, and fabricated structural metal 
products  22.8  11.7 
Other  fabricated  metal products  9.1  2.5 
Electric  lighting  and wiring  equipment  12.7  2.1 
Sources: Derived from U.S. Office of Business Economics, Input-Output  Structure  of the U.S. Economy: 
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Figure 2.  Output and Relative Prices of Selected Building Materials, 
1965-70 
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Source:  Construction  Review,  selected  issues,  Tables  E-2  and  P-1.  Relative  prices  are calculated  by  divid- 
ing  the  wholesale  price  index  for  the  material  by  the  wholesale  price  index  for  all  industrial  commodities. 
These  calculations  use  the group  index,  except  for  iron  and  steel,  whose  inidex was  taken  as  the  simple  aver- 
age  of structural  shapes,  reinforcing  bars,  galvanized  sheets,  nails,  hardware,  and  steel  for  buildings. 366  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1971 
trial  commodities.  The relative  price  of plumbing  fixtures  has risen  slowly 
over  time  with  little  relation  to changes  in output;  if anything,  it rose  faster 
in years  when output  fell. The relative  price  of paint  has followed  move- 
ments  in output  since  1968.  The  relative  price  of iron  and  steel  products  fell 
slowly  through  1968  and  has  risen  since  then  in the face  of declining  output. 
Cement  prices  were essentially  stable  from 1966 through  1968 and have 
risen  since  then.  Relative  prices  of other  materials,  heating  equipment,  and 
clay  products  have  been  essentially  constant,  even  in  the  face  of large  changes 
in output.  The  relative  price  of gypsum  goods  is falling  even  as output  is ris- 
ing; this price  decline  is concentrated  in the price  of wallboard,  which  has 
dropped  substantially  since  1968. 
Due to the normal  lags in construction,  the surge  in housing  starts  in 
1967  carried  over  into homebuilding  construction  in 1968  as well. The at- 
tendant  substantial  increases  in output  of material  inputs,  which  increased 
an average  of 10.8  percent,  are shown  in Figure  2. Only  for plumbing  fix- 
tures,  gypsum,  and  paint  were  price  advances  in excess  of general  inflation 
and  the increase  in the relative  price  of gypsum  was only  0.1 percent.  Most 
materials  appear  to be available  in quite  elastic  supplies. 
The price  behavior  of materials  in earlier  periods  of rapid  expansion  in 
homebuilding  also supports  the conclusion  of generally  elastic  supplies.  In 
1959,  with large  increases  in the output  of materials  (apart  from iron and 
steel,  output  increases  averaged  over  14 percent),  the only  advances  in rela- 
tive prices  were  in plumbing  fixtures  and clay products.  Relative  prices  of 
all the other  materials  declined.  Experience  in 1963  was a bit more  mixed, 
with  relative  prices  of plumbing  fixtures,  clay  products,  and gypsum  rising 
The  largest  increase  was  for  clay  products  and  was  only  0.7  percentage  point. 
In summary,  if one can extrapolate  from the record,  Figure  2 suggests 
that, abstracting  from  price  increases  due to general  inflation,  the price  of 
plumbing  fixtures  can be expected  to rise modestly;  those of cement  and 
iron  and  steel  may  increase  slightly  more;  and  that  of paint  will  rise  with  the 
increase  in residential  construction  expenditures.  Other  materials,  however, 
appear  to be available  in fairly  elastic  supply. 
Lumber  and  Plywood  Requirements 
Lumber  and plywood  requirements  for building  500,000  housing  units 
were  developed  in much  the  same  way  as  labor  requirements.  With  the  avail- Craig  Swan  367 
Table  7. Lumber  and  Plywood  Required  for Housing  Construction,  1968 
Per  Per $1,000 of 
housing  construction 
Material  unit  cost 
Lumber  (board  feet) 
Single-family  12,900  696 
Multifamily  4,685  449 
Plywood  (square  feet) 
Single-family  4,450  240 
Multifamily  2,005  205 
Source: Author's estimates derived from data in Rising Costs of Housing: Lumber  Price Increases, Hear- 
ings before the House Committee on Banking and Currency, 91 Cong. 1 sess. (1969). 
able  data  for 1968  on the amount  of lumber  and  plywood  used  by size and 
type of dwelling  unit,  calculations  were  made  of the amount  of these  mate- 
rials  per  unit and  per  thousand  dollars  of construction  cost (see  Table  7). 
To use  these  figures  is to assume  that  the amount  of lumber  and  plywood 
embodied  in each  dollar  of dwelling  unit  will  remain  at its 1968  level.  Greatly 
augmented  demand,  however,  could  raise  prices  and induce  some substitu- 
tion away  from  lumber  and  plywood  to other  building  materials.  But,  as in- 
dicated  earlier,  these figures  are intended  as projections,  not predictions. 
Recent  figures  on lumber  and  plywood  use appear  to be in line with  longer- 
run  trends.  Considered  in relation  to each  thousand  dollars  of construction 
cost,  lumber  has  shown  little  consistent  movement  over  the  sixties.  Plywood 
has followed  a rising  trend,  although  observers  feel that  much  of its poten- 
tial substitution  for other building  materials  has been accomplished  and 
only more  limited  areas  of substitution  remain.14 
Given  the lumber  and plywood  requirements  per unit and the assump- 
tions,  laid out above,  about  the size  and  type  of housing,  total  requirements 
for 500,000  housing  units are 4.3 billion  board  feet of lumber  and 1.6 bil- 
lion square  feet of plywood.  It is not surprising  that these  numbers  repre- 
sent major  increases  in output  of both materials,  for residential  construc- 
tion is a major  market  for both. From 1962  to 1967  it accounted  for an 
estimated  37 percent  of total lumber  consumption  and probably  a similar 
proportion  of plywood  consumption.15  The lumber  to build  500,000  more 
14. Dwight Hair and Alice H. Ulrich, The Demand  and Price Situation  for Forest 
Products,  1970-71, U.S. Department  of Agriculture,  Forest  Service,  Miscellaneous  Publi- 
cation No' 1165  (March 1970),  p. 30. 
15. First  Annual  Report  on National  Housing  Goals,  H. Doc. 91-63, 91 Cong. 1 sess. 
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housing  units  represents  11 percent  of 1970  lumber  consumption;  for ply- 
wood,  the corresponding  figure  is 9 percent. 
LUMBER PRICES 
From 1961 to  1970 lumber  consumption  and prices (deflated  by the 
wholesale  price index for industrial  commodities)  increased  in step (see 
Table  8). Consumption  expanded  17  percent  and  relative  prices  rose 12  per- 
cent. During the winter  of 1968-69,  lumber  prices  rose dramatically,  as 
housing  starts  advanced  through  1968,  reaching  an annual  rate  of 1,705,000 
units  in January  1969.  The resulting  stepped-up  demand  for lumber,  along 
with expectations  of continued  high levels of starts,  coincided  with some 
special  problems  restricting  the supply  of logs: adverse  weather,  a boxcar 
shortage,  and some labor shortages.  The consequence  was a sharp  rise in 
price. 
During  1969  and  1970,  as housing  activity  declined  and  the special  supply 
problems  were eliminated,  lumber  prices  fell. The decline  began  in April 
1969  and amounted  to 26 percent  in the next  twelve  months. 
One  contributing  factor  was action  taken  in early  1969  by the Nixon ad- 
ministration  to increase  the supply  of lumber  and help lower prices.  On 
March  19,  President  Nixon ordered  an increase  in the timber  cut on public 
lands-1.1 billion  board  feet over  the next  fifteen  months-and announced 
a cutback  of Defense  Department  purchases.  Restrictions  on the export  of 
Table 8.  Consumption  and Relative Prices of Lumber, 1961-70 
Consumptiona  Relative  priceb 
Year  (billions  of board  feet)  (1967=100) 
1961  35.522  92.2 
1962  37.313  93.9 
1963  39.173  96.3 
1964  40.842  97.6 
1965  40.963  97.5 
1966  40.695  101.6 
1967  39.150  100.0 
1968  42.038  114.4 
1969  43.048  124.1 
1970  41.432  103.4 
Sources: U.S. Office of Business Economics, 1969 Business  Statistics, pp. 43, 46, 149, and Survey  of Current 
Business, Vol. 51 (June 1971), pp. S-8, -9,  -31. 
a.  Domestic production plus net imports. 
b.  Wholesale price index of lumber divided by wholesale price index of all industrial commodities. Craig  Swan  369 
logs from  public  lands  were  also imposed.  While  the administration's  ac- 
tions could  not have  had much of an immediate  impact  on actual  lumber 
supplies,  their  mere  announcement  may  have  served  to discourage  specula- 
tion about  continued  shortages,  and  thus  to lower  prices. 
Even  more  important,  the drop  in lumber  prices  reflected  the decline  in 
homebuilding  activity.  The behavior  of savings  flows  and  housing  starts  in 
early  1969  must  have  deflated  expectations  of continued  high  levels  of hous- 
ing activity.  According  to the lumber  requirements  developed  above, the 
actual  decline  in housing  construction  between  April 1969  and  April 1970 
implies  a drop  in the demand  for lumber  of 2 billion  board  feet. 
The  downward  movement  of lumber  prices  was  reversed  by the sharp  up- 
turn  in housing  starts  during  1970  and  the subsequent  surge  in construction 
expenditures.  From  its low point  in June  1970  to June  1971,  outlays  on new 
units  increased  58 percent  to an annual  rate of $31.5 billion.  This higher 
rate  is consistent  with  an increased  demand  for  lumber  of almost  4.5 billion 
board  feet and has been accompanied  by an increase  of relative  lumber 
prices  of just over 18  percent. 
The National  Association  of Home Builders  estimates  that lumber  and 
wood products  account  for about  20 percent  of the construction  cost of a 
single-family  house. A 15 percent  increase  in the prices  of these compo- 
nents  would  mean  an increase  in total construction  costs of 3 to 4 percent. 
The effect  on the selling  price  of a house would  presumably  be less-per- 
haps  2.5 to 3.5 percent.  Certain  costs, such as architectural  fees and other 
commissions,  would increase  as a markup over construction  cost, but 
others,  such  as land  prices,  need  not rise  in response  to lumber  prices. 
PLYWOOD  PRICES 
Production  of softwood  plywood  in 1970  was  more  than  five  times  that  in 
1950,  rising  from  2.676  billion  square  feet  to 13.900  billion  square  feet (see 
Table  9). The relative  price of plywood  has fallen off continuously  since 
1950  except  for years  of larger-than-average  increases  in output-years as- 
sociated  with  high  levels  of housing  starts.  From 1950  to 1960  plywood  out- 
put  nearly  tripled  while  relative  prices  dropped  more  than  35 percent.  Since 
1960  a doubling  of output  has been accompanied  by a decline  in relative 
prices  of 13  percent. 
The  experience  of the  last  few  years  suggests  that  the  period  of expanding 
output  and  declining  prices  may  well  be over.  While  output  rose 12  percent 370  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1971 
Table 9.  Production  and Relative Prices of Domestic Softwood Plywood, 
1950 and 1960-70 
Domestic  Relative 
production  prices 
Year  (billions of square feet)  (1967=100) 
1950  2.676  189.7 
1960  7.759  118.8 
1961  8.496  116.0 
1962  9.315  112.1 
1963  10.375  115.0 
1964  11.455  110.9 
1965  12.428  109.6 
1966  12.849  107.7 
1967  12.840  100.0 
1968  14.385  126.0 
1969  13.538  131.2 
1970  13.900p  103.3 
Sources: Dwight Hair and Alice Ulrich, The Demand  and  Price Situation  for Forest  Products,  1970-71, U.S. 
Department of Agriculture,  Forest Service, Miscellaneous Publication 1195 (1971), p. 71; and Construction 
Review, Vol. 17 (May 1971), Table E-2; Monthly  Labor Review, Vol. 94 (May 1971), Table 26; BLS unpub- 
lished worksheets for indexes prior to 1966. 
a.  Wholesale price index of softwood  plywood divided by the wholesale price index of all industrial 
commodities. 
p Preliminary. 
in 1968,  relative  prices  were  up 26 percent.  Part  of this  increase  was  due  to a 
restricted  supply  of logs. Also, the initial  sharp  price  rise  may have gener- 
ated expectations  that stimulated  further  increases.  Yet during  1969,  even 
though  plywood  prices  retreated,  they did not return  to their  level of 1967. 
They remained  above their 1967 level for most of 1970 and increased 
sharply  in early 1971 as housing activity  picked up. From November- 
December  of 1970  to April-May  of 1971,  the  relative  price  of softwood  ply- 
wood rose almost  13  percent. 
TIMBER SUPPLY 
The major  problem  involved  in an expansion  of both lumber  and ply- 
wood production  is the supply  of sawtimber,  particularly  softwood  saw- 
timber.  The problem  is not that  the inventory  of trees  is too small  but that 
current  rates  of harvesting  are  insufficient  to meet  projected  increases  in de- 
mand  at current  prices.  It has been estimated  that the sustainable  yield of 
softwood  sawtimber  under  conditions  of intensive  management  is between 
3 and 5 percent  of the sawtimber  inventory.  With  an inventory  of softwood Craig  Swan  371 
sawtimber  of 2 trillion  board  feet  on January  1, 1968,  this  ratio  would  mean 
a sustained  yield of 60 billion  to 100 billion board  feet. These  figures  on 
prospective  yields  are substantially  above current  rates of harvesting  and 
would  require  more  intensive  management  of timber  lands  if they  are  to be 
realized  on a sustained  basis. 
Management  of timber  lands  refers  to activities  such  as culling  dead  trees, 
pruning  and thinning,  treatment  of disease,  seeding  and reforesting  after 
cutting,  and  the maintenance  of access  roads.  More intensive  management 
permits  higher  rates  of growth  and  thus  higher  levels  of harvesting  while  the 
existing  inventory  is maintained.  But  it requires  the input  of real  resources, 
which  will  necessitate  higher  prices. 
Tables 10 and 11 show the distribution  of commercial  forest  land and 
sawtimber  inventories  and cut by ownership.  Forests cover 762 million 
acres  out of a total  land  area  in the United  States  of 2.3 billion  acres.  Of the 
total,  235 million  acres  are  classified  as unproductive  because  of low yield; 
16 million acres  are reserved  for park and wilderness  areas  and are not 
available  for harvesting. 
Private  holdings  are harvested  most intensively,  with a cut-to-inventory 
ratio  in 1962  of 3.3 percent.  Private  holdings  were  supplying  63 percent  of 
Table 10.  Commercial  Forest Land and Sawtimber  Inventories  in the 
United States, by Ownership,  January 1, 1968 
National  Other  Forest  Other 
Type  of forest  forest  public  industry  private  Total 
Commercialforest  land 
Percentage distribution  19  9  13  59  100 
Acres (millions)  97  45  65  303  510 
Softwood  sawtimber 
Percentage distribution  53  12  16  19  100 
Board feet (billions)  1,064  233  325  381  2,003 
Hardwood  sawtimber 
Percentage distribution  8  8  14  70  100 
Board feet (billions)  37  38  70  342  487 
Total  sawtimber 
Percentage distribution  44  11  16  29  100 
Board feet (billions)  1,101  271  395  723  2,490 
Source: Effect of Lumber  Prices and Shortages  on the Nation's Housing Goals, Report of the Subcommittee 
on Housing and Urban Affairs of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency,  S. Doc. 91-27, 91 Cong. 
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Table 11. Cut of Sawtimber  on Commercial  Forest Land  in the United States, 
by Ownership,  1962 
National  Other  Forest  Othler 
Type  of sawtimber  forest  public  industry  private  Total 
Softwood 
Percentage  28  9  35  28  100 
Board feet (billions)  10.3  3.4  12.7  10.3  36.7 
Hardwood 
Percentage  3  3  17  75  100 
Board feet (billions)  0.4  0.4  2.0  8.8  11.7 
Total 
Percentage  22  8  30  39  100 
Board feet (billions)  10.8  3.8  14.7  19.1  48.4 
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Timber  Trends  in the United States, Forest Re- 
source Report 17 (1965), p. 179. 
the softwood  cut while  holding  only 34 percent  of the softwood  inventory. 
Softwood inventories  are largely concentrated  on national forest land, 
which  is being  harvested  least intensively.16  In 1962  softwood  timber  har- 
vest  on all national  forest  land  was  only  0.9 percent  of the inventory  of saw- 
timber,  as contrasted  with a harvest  rate of 3.7 percent  on forest  industry 
land. Indirect  evidence  suggests  that the yield on national  forest  land has 
risen  to about 1.2 percent  of inventory,  while  the yield on forest  industry 
land has remained  at about 3.7 percent.  If the former  could be raised  to 
match  the  latter,  an additional  26 billion  board  feet  per  year  would  be forth- 
coming.  While  such an increase  is problematic  at best, the Forest  Service 
has  stated  that  "under  an accelerated  management  program  that  is well  bal- 
anced  in all respects,  we could increase  timber  harvests  on the National 
Forests  over  7 billion  board  feet  in the next  decade."17  The  major  problem 
leading  the Forest  Service  to restrict  the harvest  on its land is inadequate 
financing  for reforestation,  timber  stand  improvement,  and other  elements 
of intensive  management.  In 1961  the President  proposed  a ten-year  devel- 
opment  plan for national  forests;  in 1970  timber  stand  improvement  and 
reforestation  work  were  budgeted  at 29.5  percent  of the  level  proposed  nine 
16. Private owners hold almost 60 percent of commercial  forest land but only 29 
percent of sawtimber  inventories.  These lands could be stocked more intensively  with 
timber,  but this is a long-run,  not a short-run,  solution. 
17. National  Timber  Supply  Act, Hearing  before  the Subcommittee  on Soil Conserva- 
and Forestry,  Senate Committee  on Agriculture  and Forestry,  91 Cong. 1 sess. (1969), 
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years  earlier.18  The  Forest  Service  has  a backlog  of 4.8 million  acres  in need 
of reforestation  and 13  million  acres  in need  of timber  stand  improvement. 
Forest  Service  estimates  indicate  these  lands  could  yield  5 billion  board  feet 
of timber  annually.  While  there  are  large  differences  between  estimates  by 
the  Forest  Service  and  others  about  how  much  of an increase  in timber  har- 
vesting  can  be expected  from  the national  forests,  it does  appear  that  a sub- 
stantial  increase  in timber  cutting  could  be achieved  without  jeopardizing 
the multiple-use  principle  of the national  forests. 
There  is, however,  some dispute  over  how soon increased  harvesting  of 
national  forest  land could begin.  Forest industry  spokesmen  believe  that 
accelerated  cutting  could begin immediately.  The Forest Service  is more 
cautious  and has indicated  its unwillingness  to accelerate  cutting  before 
continuing  levels  of financing  are  assured  and  intensive  management  begins 
to produce  higher  yields.  It is interesting  to note that  while  projected  work- 
load factors  for the Forest  Service  for timber  stand  improvement  and tree 
planting  and seeding rose 51 percent  in the 1971 federal budget, they 
dropped  22 percent  in the 1972  budget. 
THE PRICE  EFFECTS 
What  impact  would  the building  of 500,000  more  housing  units  have on 
lumber  and  plywood  prices?  Experience  from  the early  and  middle  sixties  is 
inappropriate  for evaluating  the immediate  effect  on prices  of a large  in- 
crease  in demand.  The expansion  of lumber  consumption  in that period 
was over  levels  of output  that had been  attained  in the fifties;  lumber  con- 
sumption  in 1964-66  was at the same level as in 1955  and 1956.  But the 
levels  attained  in 1968  and 1969  were  higher  than  any  others  in the postwar 
period.  It may  well  be  that  lumber  consumption  has  reached  a point  at which 
the short-run  supply  curve  is quite inelastic.  The recent  rise in starts  has 
been accompanied  by large  increases  in the relative  prices  of lumber  and 
plywood.  An additional  jump  in starts  by 500,000  units  would  be expected 
to affect  lumber  and  plywood  prices  immediately  and  sharply,  raising  them 
by 15  to 20 percent.  However,  they  should  moderate  somewhat  as suppliers 
respond  to them with increased  imports,  more intensive  management  of 
existing  lands,  and harvesting  on new  lands,  all of which  take  time  to have 
an impact  on supply. 
18. Effect  of Lumber  Prices and Shortages  on the Nation's  Housing  Goals,  Report of 
the Subcommittee  on Housing and Urban Affairs  of the Senate Committee  on Banking 
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Mortgage  Requirements 
Mortgage  requirements  for 500,000  housing  units  were  developed  from 
the initial  assumptions  about  unit size and type, along  with additional  as- 
sumptions  about  inflation,  site cost, and  loan-to-value  ratio.  To convert  to 
1971  prices  construction  costs originally  given  in 1970  prices,  it is assumed 
that they  are  rising  by 5.5 percent  over  the year. 
During  the first  half of 1971,  the adjusted  Boeckh  index  of construction 
costs  rose  at an annual  rate  of 7.6 percent.  However,  several  factors  suggest 
that this rate of increase  will be moderated  in the second half of the 
year.  Higher  unemployment  and  the workings  of the construction  industry 
stabilization  board would be expected  to reduce  wage settlements.  More 
importantly,  the  President's  wage-price  freeze  and  subsequent  decisions  can 
be expected  to moderate  increases  in construction  costs. 
Additional  elements  of the selling  price-land and other  costs-are  as- 
sumed  to be 25 percent  of construction  costs for single-family  units  and 9 
percent  of construction  costs for multifamily  units.  For single-family  units 
this  ratio  implies  a mean  selling  price  of $24,432  in 1970,  which  is  just above 
the Census  Bureau  figure  of $23,400  for median  sales price.  The loan-to- 
value  ratio is assumed  to be 72 percent  for multifamily  mortgages  and 79 
percent  for single-family  mortgages.  These  figures  are  consistent  with  recent 
experience  and were  used in projections  associated  with the Housing  and 
Urban  Development  Act of 1968.19 
These  adjustments,  together  with  the earlier  assumptions  about  the size 
and number  of units, imply gross  mortgage  requirements  of $6.9 billion. 
This  figure  overstates  the necessary  net increase  in mortgages.  The  building 
of 500,000  more  units  will allow  the removal  of some  additional  units  from 
the housing  stock that would otherwise  have been financed  and will thus 
reduce  the net mortgage  requirements. 
SAVINGS  FLOWS 
A net increase  in mortgages  of $6.9 billion  would  represent  a 36 percent 
increase  in home and multifamily  mortgage  lending  over  the 1970  level of 
19. See Housing  and Urban  Development  Legislation  of 1968,  Hearings  before  the Sub- 
committee on Housing and Urban Affairs of the Senate Committee  on Banking and 
Currency,  90 Cong. 2 sess. (1968), Pt. 2, pp. 1372-73. Craig Swan  375 
$19.3  billion.  This  is a large  increase  but not impossible  to achieve.  Prelim- 
inary  data  for  the  first  half  of 1971  place  mortgage  lending  at an annual  rate 
of $28.6  billion.  The  flow  of savings  to mutual  savings  banks  and  to savings 
and loan associations  during  the first  half of this year  can only be charac- 
terized  as phenomenal.  According  to preliminary  data, savings  deposits  at 
mutual  savings  banks  were  increasing  at a seasonally  adjusted  rate  of almost 
$12 billion  during  the first  half of this year,  compared  with $4.4 billion  in 
1970.  Saving  shares  and Home Loan Bank advances  at savings  and loan 
associations  rose at a seasonally  adjusted  rate of $26.7  billion  for the first 
half of this year, far greater  than the 1970  increase  of $12.4 billion.  The 
inflow  of time deposits  at commercial  banks  was also at higher  rates,  but 
the change  was not as dramatic  as those of the thrift  institutions. 
What  will  these  savings  flows  mean  in terms  of mortgage  lending?  Table 
12  suggests  an answer.  It reports  the  results  of multiplying  the excess  of sav- 
ings inflows  during  the first  half of 1971  over their  rates  for 1970  by mar- 
ginal portfolio  percentages.  These  figures  represent  the ratio of increased 
mortgages  to increased  savings  or time deposits  over the period 1965-70. 
The table  suggests  that  the increment  in savings  flows  will mean  additional 
mortgage  lending of over $18 billion. The figures  in Table 12 implicitly 
assume  that savings  flows in the second half of the year will remain  at 
the levels observed  during  the first  half. This assumption  may seem a bit 
implausible,  especially  with respect  to savings  flows to the thrift  institu- 
Table  12. Relation  of Savings  Flows  to Mortgage  Acquisitions  of Savings 
Institutions,  1970-71 
Dollar amounts  in billions 
Potential 
Savings  inflows  Marginal  increase  in 
mortgage  mortgage 
Type  of institution  1970  1971J  Increment  ratiob  acquisitions 
Commercial  bankso  $36.7  $43.9  $ 7.2  0.157  $  1.13 
Life insurance  companiesd  7.1  10.3  3.2  0.142  0.45 
Mutual savings  banks  4.4  11.9  7.5  0.510  3.83 
Savings  and loan associationse  12.4  26.7  14.3  0.900  12.87 
Sources: Cols. 1 and 2-Board  of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Division of Research and 
Statistics, "Flow of Funds, Seasonally Adjusted, 2nd Quarter, 1971, Preliminary"  (August 6,  1971; pro- 
cessed); col. 4-Flow  of Funds Accounts: Financial Assets and Liabilities Outstanding,  1959-1970 (May 4, 
1971; processed). 
a.  Seasonally adjusted annual rate for the first half of the year. 
b.  Ratio of increased mortgages to increased savings or time deposits over the 1965-70 period. 
c.  Total time deposits, including large negotiable certificates of deposit. 
d.  Financial assets minus policy loans. 
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tions. Some appear  to have arisen  as part of an adjustment  of portfolios 
away  from government  securities.  Consequently,  figures  in Table 12 were 
recalculated  on the assumption  that all flow variables  during  the second 
half  of the  year  will  be at one-half  their  level  during  the  first  half  of the  year. 
The figures  imply  an increment  in mortgage  lending  of $8.6 billion,  still in 
excess  of the $6.9 billion  requirements. 
These  figures  indicate  little problem  in financing  the most recent  incre- 
ment  in starts.  Furthermore,  other  factors  may  ease  the  financing  of an addi- 
tional 500,000  housing  units.  A decline  in long-term  interest  rates  should 
help maintain  savings  flows to the thrift  institutions  as well as affect  the 
portfolio  allocations  of institutions  with  asset  flexibility-commercial  banks, 
life  insurance  companies,  and  mutual  savings  banks.  There  is good  reason  to 
believe  that the actual  1970  level of mortgage  lending  was lower  than  that 
which  actually  could have been attained  out of 1970  savings  flows.  These 
flows  were  up sharply  over  their  rates  in 1969.  The  normal  lag in the alloca- 
tion of funds  to mortgages  means  that  to some  extent  1970  mortgage  lend- 
ing reflected  savings  flows  in 1969,  not the higher  levels  of 1970.  For com- 
mercial  banks  and the thrift  institutions,  the ratio of mortgage  lending  to 
deposit  inflows  for 1970 is below the corresponding  figure  for the whole 
1965-70  period.  If mortgage  lending  by commercial  banks  is particularly 
sensitive  to time deposits  other  than large  certificates  of deposit,  there  is 
even more  room for optimism,  for these  deposits  have risen  even more  in 
1971  than  have  total  time  deposits. 
GOVERNMENT  ASSISTANCE 
The federal  government  has been fostering  the establishment  of several 
mortgage  market  innovations,  whose further  progress  during  1971  could 
facilitate  the financing  of a high  level  of housing  starts.  The  innovations  in- 
clude the pass-through  mortgage  security  developed  by the Government 
National  Mortgage  Association  (GNMA) to tap the resources  of pension 
funds, and the secondary  market  in conventional  mortgages  being orga- 
nized  by the Federal  Home  Loan  Bank  Board,  which  has budgeted  acquisi- 
tions at $1 billion  for 1971.  In August  1971  President  Nixon authorized  an 
additional  $2 billion  for GNMA to use in purchasing  FHA and  VA mort- 
gages.  Finally,  continued  high  levels  of mortgage  acquisitions  by  the  Federal 
National Mortgage  Association  will help to ease the financing  of a high 
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In summary,  current  high  rates  of savings  inflows  appear  more  than  ade- 
quate  to meet the $6.9 billion  mortgage  requirements  of 500,000  housing 
units.  Given  a decline  in long-term  interest  rates  and  continued  federal  sup- 
port  of mortgage  markets,  funds  appear  to be available  to finance  a further 
increase  in housing  starts. 
Summary  and  Conclusions 
There  should  be little  trouble  from  the supply  side  in sustaining  a level  of 
2 million  housing  starts  in the immediate  future.  Moreover,  there  is reason 
for optimism  about  the nation's  ability  to build  another  large  increment  of 
houses.  Recent  high rates  of savings  flows  to commercial  banks  and thrift 
institutions  have  released  financial  constraints  on homebuilding  for the  cur- 
rent  period.  If sustained,  these  flows,  supplemented  by aggressive  action  by 
the federal government,  could finance  a further  substantial  increase  in 
homebuilding. 
Labor  and most materials  appear  at the moment  to be readily  available 
to homebuilders.  The  current  expansion  in homebuilding  has occurred  at a 
time of high  aggregate  unemployment,  which  works  to increase  the supply 
of labor  to construction  in general,  and  a time  of reduced  levels  of nonresi- 
dential  construction,  which  augments  the supply  of labor  to homebuilding. 
In the aggregate  the requirements  for skilled  workers  in homebuilding  ap- 
pear  to be matched  by reductions  in other  forms  of construction.  Should 
there  be a marked  increase  in either  nonresidential  construction  or in gen- 
eral economic  activity,  the availability  of labor to homebuilding  will be 
curtailed. 
The supplies  of most building  materials  appear  to be quite  elastic;  they 
expanded  in 1968  as well as in earlier  housing  booms  with  relatively  small 
movements  in relative  prices.  Lumber  and plywood  are the major  excep- 
tions: As demand  for them moves up with the increase  in homebuilding, 
their  prices  will rise  substantially. Comments  and 
Discussion 
John  Kareken:  Craig  Swan  has given  us a very  plausible  and optimistic  as- 
sessment  of the nation's  ability  to build 500,000  more houses a year, or 
2,500,000  in total. If anything,  I would  say the assessment  may be a shade 
too optimistic.  For one thing, housing  has already  risen greatly  from its 
1970  average  and presumably  has absorbed  a lot of labor in the process. 
The labor requirements  created  by the next addition  of 500,000  units to 
housing  starts  may  not be met  quite  as easily  as was  suggested  in the paper. 
Another  factor  that may not be so favorable  is the availability  of mort- 
gage  money.  The  flow  of funds  into the thrift  institutions  in the first  half of 
1971  was super-phenomenal;  Swan  has cut this flow in half in making  his 
projection  of funds.  While  it looks prudent,  the assumed  cutback  may not 
be large  enough.  The recent  heavy  flow of funds  into the thrift  institutions 
reflected  not just a stock  adjustment,  but also-at  least according  to some 
people-fears about the economy.  If the new economic  policy alleviates 
those fears, that incentive for the accumulation  of liquid funds will 
disappear. 
The  historical  analysis  revealed  a striking  contrast  between  the 1949  and 
the 1967  increases  in housing  starts,  both  of which  caused  sharp  increases  in 
costs and  relative  prices,  and  the 1954  and 1958  increases,  neither  of which 
had that effect.  The 1949  and 1967  increases  were  larger,  but other  factors 
seem  important.  The ease of the 1954  and 1958  advances  may suggest  that 
we should  not concern  ourselves  too much  with  smoothing  house  building. 
There  must  be some  gains  from  smooth  output,  but if the same  amount  of 
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housing  can be obtained  over  some  time  interval,  it may  not be a bad idea 
to build  the houses  when  nonresidential  construction  is weak.  In a rough 
way that is what  our  rather  queer  financial  arrangements  have  so far guar- 
anteed.  The  evidence  that  Swan  has  provided  suggests  that  we may  not have 
great  cause  to worry  about  smoothing  the production  of housing. 
General  Discussion 
Nancy  Teeters  reported  that work  she had done to evaluate  the reason- 
ableness  of the national  housing  goals  revealed  that  the underlying  demand 
for  housing  is very  strong.  Shifting  demographic  factors,  primarily  the  large 
increase  in the relative  number  of young  people  entering  the labor  force  in 
the marriageable  ages, is responsible  for this demand.  The demand  from 
this source  will remain  strong  for at least five years.  Moreover,  as these 
young  people  start  having  children,  demand  will shift  back  toward  single- 
family  homes,  if past  patterns  prevail,  and  there  may  be some  retreat  from 
the relatively  high demand  for multifamily  units  that prevailed  in the late 
1960s. 
She felt that the strong  underlying  demand  for housing  posed a policy 
dilemma.  Swan's  paper  supports  the informal  observation  that  strong  hous- 
ing demand  is usually  satisfied  only  when  business  fixed  investment  is rela- 
tively weak. If the investment  tax credit  is again  reinstated,  the resulting 
increase  in business  fixed investment  is likely to squeeze  residential  con- 
struction.  Given the demand  outlook for housing  and the unsatisfactory 
condition  of much of the existing  housing  stock, reinstatement  of the in- 
vestment  tax credit  may  be a very  poor policy  choice,  she concluded. 
Charles  Bischoff  pointed  out that  there  were  several  ways  in which  the in- 
vestment  tax credit  might  indirectly  affect  residential  construction.  He re- 
ported  evidence  that  the investment  tax credit  tends  to shift  business  capital 
spending  toward  equipment  and away from nonresidential  construction, 
other  things  being  equal.  To this  extent  if the real  competition  for  resources 
comes from within the construction  industry,  the investment  tax credit 
should  not hurt  housing. 
Another  important  question  has to do with the flow of funds.  If the in- 
vestment  tax credit  stimulates  business  capital  spending  more  than dollar 
for dollar,  it will  tend  to tighten  long-term  credit  markets.  Clearly,  a loosen- 
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immediately;  but its impact  would  have  a substantial  lag. In the longer  run, 
the situation  would  be reversed,  according  to neoclassical  equations  that  in- 
dicate  that  investment  is stimulated  more  than  dollar  for dollar  over  a two- 
or three-year  horizon,  and  the supply  of funds  for housing  would  suffer  an 
adverse  effect. 
There  was some inconclusive  discussion  of whether  particularly  strong 
competition  for resources  took place between  machinery  and equipment 
industries  on the one  hand,  and  housing  on the  other.  John  Kareken  stressed 
that  highways  and  other  public  works  as well  as business  construction  com- 
peted  with  homebuilding. 
Arthur  Okun  reported  the view of senior  adviser  Alan Greenspan,  who 
was unable  to attend  the conference,  that labor  supplies  for homebuilding 
were  extremely  sensitive  to the general  state of labor markets.  He would 
emphasize  this more strongly  than competition  with nonresidential  con- 
struction.  While  2.5 million  homes  might  be built  in today's  labor market, 
it might be difficult  to keep building  2 million houses if the aggregate 
unemployment  rate  began  to approach  4 percent. 
Okun  felt that Swan's  paper  illuminated  the supply  considerations  that 
permitted,  and  contributed  to, the extreme  variability  of the industry.  Few 
factors  seem specific  to homebuilding.  The labor force is highly  mobile. 
With  the exception  of lumber,  the materials  used  by homebuilding  are  also 
used widely elsewhere.  Unlike manufacturing,  no well-defined  capacity 
limitation  is set by plant  and  equipment  stocks. 
William  Poole  noted  that  big shifts  in the number  of people  employed  in 
construction  occur  without  much  impact  on relative  wage  rates,  suggesting 
a high elasticity  in the supply  of labor.  This observation  implied  that the 
price  elasticity  of demand  must be high also. If the price  elasticity  of de- 
mand  were  low, presumably  activity  and employment  would  remain  more 
stable  and wages  would  rise or fall to the extent  necessary  to maintain  the 
required  labor  in home construction.  Thomas  Juster  noted, however,  that 
the large  downward  swings  of activity  in the past seem  to reflect  shortages 
of financial  resources  rather  than of labor  or materials. 
Juster  reported  his general  impression  that  single-family  house  construc- 
tion and certain  types of commercial  building  had experienced  a very 
marked  shift away  from on-site  construction  to in-factory  production.  Of 
course,  the rapid  increase  in mobile  homes  can be regarded  that way, but 
the trend  extends  far beyond  them.  This new kind of factory-built  housing 
probably  has substantial  productivity  gains  and  flexibility.  Its existence  fur- Craig  Swan  381 
ther reduces  the danger  of labor  supply  shortages  for on-site  building.  At 
the same  time that workers  are  needed  to fill conventional  jobs in housing 
construction,  they might be in the process  of being released  from other 
kinds  of construction  activities  because  of increased  industrialized  fabrica- 
tion. Although  Juster  noted  the lack of data  on the growth  and  relative  im- 
portance  of in-factory  activity,  his general  impression  was  that  it was grow- 
ing rapidly,  mainly  because  of price  advantages  and  the absence  of certain 
types  of restrictive  labor  practices  that affect  on-site  construction. 
Craig  Swan said that recent  surveys  would soon make available  more 
information  on the relative  importance  of factory-made  housing.  The pre- 
liminary  data  support  the impression  of a marked  shift  toward  prefabrica- 
tion. The on-site  occupational  mix has shifted  toward  unskilled  labor,  im- 
plying increased  use of prefabricated  parts. 
Warren  Smith  believed  that  the prospect  for a new investment  tax credit 
was  one part  of a general  shift  toward  an expansionary  fiscal  policy,  includ- 
ing other  tax  cuts  of a permanent  nature.  When  the  economy  recovers,  these 
cuts  will  require  monetary  policy  to be tighter  than  it otherwise  would  have 
been. Indirectly,  current  policy decisions  may be generating  a situation  in 
which it will become very difficult  to finance  housing in a prosperous 
economy. 
Thomas  Juster  felt that, even under  such circumstances,  housing  could 
compete  for funds  better  than it had in the past.  Up through  1966-67,  the 
supply  of funds  to housing  was constrained  by the 6 percent  usury  laws in 
most states.  Many of these usury  laws were  liberalized  subsequently.  For 
the first  time  in years,  a legitimately  free  market  for funds  is available  to the 
housing  market.  In that respect,  mortgage  borrowing  is now more  closely 
akin  to Treasury  debt  and  business  borrowing.  Unlike  their  situation  in the 
past,  mortgage  borrowers  can  compete  for funds,  paying  whatever  rates  are 
required. 